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Good Faith in the Performance and Enforcement of Australian 
Commercial Contracts 
 






The twists and turns in the ongoing development of the implied common law 
good faith obligation in the commercial contractual arena continue to prove 
fertile academic ground.1  Despite a lack of guidance from the High Court,2 
the lower courts have been besieged by claims based, in part, on the implied 
obligation.3  Although lower court authority is lacking consistency4 and the 
                                                 
 Dr Bill Dixon B Econ LLB (Hons) Qld LLM SJD QUT; Admitted Lawyer, Queensland; Senior 
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
1 See eg Paterson JM, ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts? A Franchising Case Study’ 
(2001) 29(4) ABLR 270; Webb E, ‘The Scope of the Implied Duty of Good Faith-Lessons from 
Commercial Retail Tenancy Cases’ (2001) 9 APLJ 1; Carter JW and Stewart A, 
‘Interpretation, Good Faith and the ‘True Meaning’ of Contracts: The Royal Botanic Decision’ 
(2002) 18 JCL 1; Carlin TM, ‘The Rise (and Fall) of Implied Duties of Good Faith in 
Contractual Performance in Australia’ (2002) 25(1) UNSWLJ 99; Baron A, ‘Good Faith’ and 
Construction Contracts – From Small Acorns Large Oaks Grow’ (2002) 22 Aust Bar Rev 54; 
Peden E, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (Butterworths, 2003); Carter JW and 
Peden E, ‘Good Faith in Australian Contract Law’ (2003) 19 JCL 155; Wallwork A, ‘A 
Requirement of Good Faith in Construction Contracts?’ (2004) 20 BCLJ 257; Dixon B, 
‘Common Law Obligations of Good Faith in Australian Commercial Contracts – A Relational 
Recipe’ (2005) 33 ABLR 87; Dixon B, ‘What is the Content of the Common Law Obligation of 
Good Faith in Commercial Franchises?’ (2005) 33 ABLR 207; Dixon B, ‘Can the Common 
Law Obligation of Good Faith be Contractually Excluded?’ (2007) 35 ABLR 110; Dixon B, 
‘What is the Content of the Common Law Obligation of Good Faith in Commercial Leases?’ 
(2007) 14 APLJ 113. 
2 A decision of the High Court is still awaited. In Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v 
South Sydney City Council [2002] HCA 5; (2002) 76 ALJR 436 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted (at [40]) that while the issues respecting the 
existence and scope of a ‘good faith’ doctrine were important, it was an inappropriate 
occasion to consider them. Kirby J (at [89]) and Callinan J (at [156]) also did not consider it 
necessary to address these issues. 
3 See, eg, ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Berri Ltd [2005] VSC 201, Advance Fitness v Bondi 
Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264; Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349; Apple 
Communications v Optus Mobile [2001] NSWSC 635; Asia Pacific Resources Pty Ltd v 
Forestry Tasmania (unreported, Sup Ct, Tas, Full Ct, Cox CJ, Underwood and Wright JJ, 4 
September 1997); Asia Television Ltd v Yau’s Entertainment Pty Ltd (2000) 48 IPR 283; 
Australian Cooperative Foods Ltd v Norco Cooperative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267; Australian 
Hotels Association (NSW) v TAB Ltd [2006] NSWSC 293; Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104; Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd 
[2002] WASC 286; Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192; Biscayne 
Partners Pty Ltd v Valance Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 874; Blackler v Felpure Pty Ltd 
[1999] NSWSC 958; Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 382; 
Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Renstell Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 167; Commonwealth Development Bank of 
Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 965; Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar 
Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 472; Cubic Transportation Systems Inc v State of New South 
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‘decisions in which lower courts have recognised the legitimacy of implication 
of a term of good faith vary in their suggested rationales’,5 the implied 
obligation may provide some comfort to a party to ‘at least some commercial 
contracts’6 faced with a contractual counterpart exhibiting symptoms of bad 
faith. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Wales [2002] NSWSC 656; Dalcon Constructions Pty Ltd v State Housing Commission (1998) 
14 BCLC 477; De Pasquale v The Australian Chess Federation [2000] ACTSC 94; Dickson 
Property Management Services Pty Ltd v Centro Property Management (Vic) Pty Ltd (2000) 
180 ALR 485; Dockpride Pty Ltd v Subiaco Redevelopment Authority [2005] WASC 211; 
Dresna Pty Ltd v Linknarf Management Services Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2006] FCA 540; Easts Van 
Villages Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act [2001] NSWSC 
559; Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] VSC 502; Elfic Ltd v Macks 
[2000] QSC 18; Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] 
VSCA 228; Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310; Forklift 
Engineering v Powerlift [2000] VSC 443; Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) 
Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-703; Gibson v Parkes District Hospital (1991) 26 NSWLR 9; Golden 
Sands Pty Ltd v Davegale Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 458; Hoppers Crossing Club Ltd v Tattersalls 
Gaming Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 114; Howtrac Rentals Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors (NZ) Ltd 
[2000] VSC 415; Hudson Resources Ltd v Australian Diatomite Mining Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 
314; Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1; Hughes 
Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (1993) 
31 NSWLR 91; Ingot Capital Investments v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets [No 6] [2007] 
NSWSC 124; K & S Freighters Pty Ltd v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1325; 
Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd v Australian Aerospace Ltd [2007] VSC 200; In Kendells (NSW) 
Pty Ltd (In Liq) Kendell v Sweeney [2005] QSC 64; Lay v Alliswell Pty Ltd (2002) V Conv R 
54-651; LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 886; Luce 
Optical v Budget Specs (Franchising) [2005] FCA 1486; Maitland Main Collieries Pty Ltd v 
Xstrata Mt Owen Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1235; Mangrove Mountain Quarries Pty Ltd v Barlow 
[2007] NSWSC 492; GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd 
(2003) 128 FCR 1; Meridian Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty Ltd [2006] 
VSC 223; News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 33; NT Power 
Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2001) 184 ALR 481; Overlook v Foxtel 
(2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143; Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty 
Ltd [2005] FCA 288; Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2006] 
FCAFC 40; Pegela Pty Ltd v  National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 
507; Radly Corp Ltd v Suncorp Metway Ltd [2001] VSC 272; Royal Botanic Gardens and 
Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 186 ALR 289; Russell v The Trustees of 
the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2007] NSWSC 104; Saxby Bridge 
Mortgages Pty Ltd v Saxby Bridge Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 433; Service Station Association 
Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 393; Shorrlong Pty Ltd v Northern 
Territory Housing Commission [1999] NTSC 140; Softplay v Perpetual [2002] NSWSC 1059; 
South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 661; 
State of New South Wales v Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 503; St George 
Soccer Football Association Inc v Soccer NSW Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1288; Thiess Contractors 
Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd (2000) 16 BCL 130; Walker v ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
(No 2) (2001) 39 ACSR 557; Walker v Citigroup Global Markets Pty Ltd (2005) 226 ALR 114; 
Wenzel v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (2002) 125 FCR 570; WMC Resources Ltd v 
Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489. 
4 Gyles J has referred to the ‘bewildering variety of opinions in the authorities and 
commentaries as to the implication of terms as to reasonableness and good faith in 
commercial contracts’: Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 
472, [166]. 
5 Meridian Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 223, [166]. 
6 To adopt the language employed by Dodds-Streeton J in ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Berri Ltd 
[2005] VSC 201, [172]. 
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Some of the judicial division concerning the good faith obligation flows from 
the continuing impact of the classical model of contract law. 
 
1.1 The Classical Model 
 
The classical model of contract law7 was premised upon an adversarial ethic 
where contractual parties legitimately sought to maximise their own interests.8  
Under this static model,9 ‘contract law simply set ground rules for self-
maximising private ordering.’10  As a corollary of the underlying ideology of 
liberal individualism,11 (or, in a market context, ‘market individualism’),12 with 
the fundamental aim of protection of the individual as an autonomous 
subject,13 contractual performance and the exercise of contractual rights and 
discretions was virtually unrestrained by considerations of the reasonable 
expectations or the legitimate interests of the other party to the contact.14  It is 
these reasonable expectations or legitimate interests that an obligation of 
good faith in contractual performance and enforcement may operate to 
protect.  
 
In Australia, the traditional ‘English’ public policy themes of freedom of 
contract and the desirability of certainty15 of contract16 in commercial dealings 
                                                 
7 A model consistent with, and reflective of, the economic theory of laissez-faire: A F Mason, 
‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’ (2000) 116 LQR 66, 70. 
8 Acting in the manner of a straightforward maximiser, that is a person who attends only to 
their own interests: D Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (1986) as referred to by R Brownsword, 
‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law’ in R 
Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context 
(1999) 13, 32. 
9 Classical contract law focused almost exclusively on the static point of contract formation: M 
Eisenberg, ‘Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University 
Law Review 805, 807. 
10 J M Feinman, ‘Relational Contract Theory in Context’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University 
Law Review 737, 738. 
11 Bigwood refers to contract law’s embracement of individualism as its dominant informing 
ideology: R Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions Part II’ (2000) 16 JCL 191, 203.  An economic justification for individualism is the 
notion of the invisible hand transforming what appears to be selfishness into public benefit: 
Anthony J Duggan, ‘Is Equity Efficient?’ (1997) 113 LQR 601, 603. 
12 A model of self-interested dealers converging on a marketplace, making their one-off 
exchanges, and going their separate ways: I R Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contract’ 
(1974) 47 S Cal LR 691. 
13 R Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions Part I’ (2000) 16 JCL 1, 19. 
14 Subject only to an observance of the like freedom and equal opportunity of all others to 
pursue their own self-interest: ibid 20. 
15 One commentator has noted that the appeal to the virtue of certainty was the crucial 
gateway signalling the presence of communication between the practical world of business 
and the closed doctrinal system of law: H Collins, ‘The Sanctimony of Contract’ in R Rawlings 
(ed), Law, Society and Economy, Centenary Essays for the London School of Economics and 
Political Science 1895-1995 (1997) 63, 66. 
16 Of course, the desirability of certainty of contract may be questioned.  ‘It is said by some, 
and disputed by others, that businessmen prefer certainty to justice, and like to know where 
they stand.’: Lord Justice Staughton, ‘Good Faith and Fairness in Commercial Contract Law’ 
(1994) 7 JCL 193, 194. 
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have been commonly repeated by those who seek to retard the development 
of any contractual obligation of good faith which may be based on competing 
policy considerations.  Members of the judiciary17 and academic 
commentators alike have been concerned about the impact of the implied 
obligation of good faith on the sanctity of freedom of contract and the potential 
uncertainty18 that may be introduced into commercial arrangements 
negotiated at arm’s length by commercial entities. 
 
The following recent observations by Warren CJ of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria are consistent with concerns of this type: 
 
 … the current reticence attending the application and recognition of a duty of good 
faith probably lies as much with the vagueness and imprecision inherent in defining 
commercial morality.  The modern law of contract has developed on the premise of 
achieving certainty in commerce.  If good faith is not readily capable of definition then 
that certainty is undermined.19 
 
 …  
 
Ultimately, the interests of certainty in contractual activity should be interfered with 
only when the relationship between the parties is unbalanced and one party is at a 
substantial disadvantage, or is particularly vulnerable in the prevailing context.  
Where commercial leviathans are contractually engaged, it is difficult to see that a 
duty of good faith will arise, leaving aside duties that might arise in a fiduciary 
relationship.  If one party to a contract is more shrewd, more cunning and out-
manoeuvres the other contracting party who did not suffer a disadvantage and who 
was not vulnerable, it is difficult to see why the latter should have greater protection 
than that provided by the law of contract.20 
 
Similar academic concerns have been expressed: 
 
Good faith … is an imperfect translation of an ethical standard into legal ideology and 
legal rules. However much it might stimulate research or encourage inquiry into 
theories underlying contract law, its appropriate home is the university where it can 
perform these functions without wreaking practical mischief.21 
 
1.2 A Changing of the Guard 
 
In more recent times, the validity of some of these traditional concerns has 
been openly questioned.  Sir Anthony Mason has queried: 
 
                                                 
17 The potential for the good faith doctrine to undermine certainty of contract law was raised 
in, amongst other decisions, Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 
582 and Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 
393. 
18 It has been observed that certainty can become a mantra, a euphemism for the sanctity of 
contracts: Collins, above n 15, 67. 
19 Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228, [3]. 
20 Ibid [4]. 
21 M Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 
Can Bus LJ 385, 412. 
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 why are not good faith and fair dealing superior objects to obsessive insistence on 
total clarity and certainty in contract?  And why is emphasis on the need for good faith 
and fair dealing not likely to lead to the resolution of business disputes?22 
 
As it impacts on the performance and enforcement of commercial contracts, 
while there remain members of the Australian judiciary who clearly favour the 
traditional approach,23 underpinned by an adversarial model and public policy 
concerns for freedom and certainty of contract, concerns of this nature seem 
less important to those who see the need for an infusion of good faith into 
Australian commercial life.24  While the issue has not yet been determined by 
the High Court, an obligation of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement has been recognised in numerous decisions of courts lower in 
the Australian judicial hierarchy.  As explored further subsequently, this 
obligation of good faith is arising in the form of an implied contractual term25 
with the suggestion having been made by a number of lower courts that the 
implication will be made as an incident of some, if not all, commercial 
contracts. 
 
Unfortunately this judicial recognition of an obligation of good faith in 
commercial contractual performance and enforcement has occurred in a 
manner that has been described as ‘tortured’26 both in its application of 
precedent and its application of relevant legal tests. 
 
2. Unresolved General Issues 
 
Due to the judicial division apparent in the Australian lower courts, a number 
of issues remain unresolved concerning the operation of the common law 
contractual obligation of good faith in commercial contracts: 
 
 To the extent that good faith is an implied contractual term, is the 
implication made by law, as a matter of fact, some form of hybrid 
implication of both fact and law or may it be justified on both bases?; 
 
 What meaning should be ascribed to the term ‘good faith’?; 
 
                                                 
22 Mason, above n 7, 89. 
23 See, eg, Gummow J in Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd 
(1993) 117 ALR 393. 
24 The former Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, commented (extrajudicially) that 
the quality of ‘Australian commercial life could only profit from an infusion of good faith’: Sir 
Anthony Mason, ‘Foreword’ (1989) 12 UNSWLJ 1, 2-3. 
25 The implication is now predominantly made as a matter of law but there have been 
instances where the implication was made, or treated, in fact.  See, eg, Advance Fitness v 
Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264; Dalcon Constructions Pty Ltd v State Housing 
Commission (1998) 14 BCLC 477; Kellcove Pty Ltd v Australian Motor Industries Ltd 
(Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Woodward J, 6 July 1990). 
26 Tyrone M Carlin, ‘The Rise (and Fall?) of Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual 
Performance in Australia’ (2002) 25(1) UNSWLJ 99, 122. 
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 Is good faith based on the reasonable expectations or legitimate 
interests of the contractual parties or, rather, on community 
standards?; 
 
 Is the good faith obligation tantamount to an obligation to act 
reasonably in contractual performance?; 
 
 Should good faith be equated to a fiduciary standard and what is the 
relevance of motive and self-interest?; 
 
 What correlation is there (if any) between good faith and equitable 
and/or statutory unconscionability?; 
 
 Apart from statutory unconscionability, what is the relevance of 
statutory references to ‘good faith’?; 
 
 What is the likely content of the good faith obligation?; and 
 
 What are the drafting implications of an implied good faith obligation?  
More particularly, can the obligation be excluded by an express 
contractual provision?  What is the effect of an inconsistent contractual 
provision?  Does a ‘sole discretion’ or an ‘entire agreement’ clause 
operate to exclude impliedly the good faith obligation?  Further, how do 
public policy considerations impact on drafting? 
 
2.1 An Implied Term Approach 
 
Unlike other jurisdictions, Australia does not have the benefit of a civil or 
commercial code, a Restatement, overarching principles or the like.  In short, 
in the development of a good faith obligation, Australia has suffered from a 
sparseness of doctrinal tools.  Unlike some jurisdictions27 where ‘fiduciary law 
has been distorted to this end’,28 the Australian vehicle for judicial 
development of a good faith obligation has been the implied contractual 
term.29 
 
In this regard, it is important to recognise, and consider, the operation of two 
categories of implied terms that are potentially quite disparate.30  Consistent 
with the classical model of contract law,31 in the first category are implied 
terms that reflect the actual intention of the parties.  These terms are 
                                                 
27 Particularly Canada and the United States: P Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and 
Morality’ (1989) 17 MULR 87, 96 (footnote 72). 
28 Ibid 96. 
29 Some academic commentators argue that good faith should be regarded as a tool of 
construction but this approach has not found judicial favour, indeed, has received critical 
comment. 
30 This is not to suggest that there may not be considerable overlap between the two 
categories as demonstrated by the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International 
v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1. 
31 Based on the intentions of the parties to the contract. 
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commonly described as being implied ‘in fact’,32 the implication being made 
ad hoc. 
 
By contrast with the first category, the second category of implied term will 
arise regardless of the actual intention of the contractual party, being based 
on imputed intention.33  Imposed on the contractual parties by law, terms 
falling within this category are commonly described as being implied ‘as a 
matter of law’ such that the contractual term is implied as a legal incident of a 
particular class of contract.34  The label ‘default rules’ is a further description 
commonly adopted in discussing implied terms of this type.35  Of the two 
categories, terms implied as a matter of law are a relative newcomer with a 
distinction between the two categories only clearly emerging in the 1950s.36 
 
An example of a contractual term being implied in fact is where a term is 
implied to provide business efficacy to the operation of the contract.  The 
Privy Council in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings37 set 
out the five requirements38 to be satisfied to enable the implication of a term 
on the basis of business efficacy.39  The five requirements, which will apply 
where the contract is a formal one,40 are: 
 
 The term must be reasonable and equitable; 
 
 The term must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, 
so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; 
 
                                                 
32 Lindy Willmott, Sharon Christensen and Des Butler, Contract Law (Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed, 2005) 256. 
33 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 103. 
34 Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104, 122-123. 
35 See, eg, See E Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (Butterworths, 2003) 
111. 
36 Commencing with the decision of the House of Lords in Lister v Romford Ice & Cold 
Storage Co. Ltd [1957] AC 555.  Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 remains the 
decision that is most frequently cited for the definitive test for implication of contractual terms, 
as a matter of law, both in English and Australian authorities. 
37(1977) 180 CLR 266. 
38 As noted by Tadgell JA in Narni Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank [2001] VSCA 31, [16] 
(with whose reasons Buchanan and Chernov JJA agreed) these five requirements, although 
expressed to operate cumulatively, may nevertheless overlap. 
39 This approach has subsequently been approved by the High Court in a number of 
decisions, probably the most well-known being Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail 
Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
40 Where the contract is informal or incomplete, the test for implication is whether it is 
necessary for the reasonable or effective operation of the contract in the circumstances: 
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 422, 442; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 
CLR 71, 123-124; Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 74 ALJR 862, 
873.  Generally, see G Tolhurst and J W Carter, ‘The New Law on Implied Terms’ (1996) 11 
JCL 76; M Bryan and M P Ellinghaus, ‘Before the High Court Fault Lines in the Law of 
Obligations: Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2000) 22 Syd LR 636.  On the 
differences for formal and informal contracts see, eg, J W Carter and G Tolhurst, ‘Implied 
Terms: Refining the New Law’ (1997) 12 JCL 152. 
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 The term must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’;41 
 
 The term must be capable of clear expression; and  
 
  The term must not contradict any express term of the contract.42 
 
A court will approach the task of implication of a contractual term on this basis 
with a degree of caution.  A term will not be implied simply because it may 
appear to be reasonable.  The cautious approach to be adopted has recently 
been reaffirmed by Kirby J in Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia 
Pty Ltd:43 
 
Whatever may be the precise legal criterion for implying terms into a contract upon 
which the parties have not expressly agreed, it would always be necessary for a court 
of our legal tradition to be very cautious about the imposition on the parties of a term 
that, for themselves, they had failed, omitted or refused to agree upon.  Such caution 
is inherent in the economic freedom to which the law of contract gives effect.44 
 
At a general level, the economic freedom that Kirby J refers to will often 
manifest itself by detailed contractual provisions that seek to regulate 
expressly all aspects of the contractual relationship.  In these circumstances 
the satisfaction of a number of the five listed requirements may be 
problematic.45  As noted by Loke, the close identification between terms 
implied in fact and the parties’ actual, but unstated, intentions permits only 
limited room for manoeuvre.46  Probably the greatest individual hurdle is that a 
term will not be implied ‘in fact’ where it is contrary to an express term of a 
contract.47 
 
By contrast, as mentioned, if a contractual term is implied ‘as a matter of law’ 
the term is implied as a legal incident of a particular class of contract.48  For 
implication to occur, a two stage test must be satisfied.49  The first 
requirement is that there is an identifiable class of contractual relationship.  
Traditionally, specific terms have been implied as a matter of law into 
contracts of a certain class.  Examples include contracts between 
                                                 
41 Employing the standard of the ‘officious bystander’.  For academic suggestion that the time 
has come for the officious bystander to be given a ‘decent burial’ refer to Bryan and 
Ellinghaus, above n 40, 647. 
42 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266, 283. 
43 (2001) 185 ALR 335. 
44 Ibid [161]. 
45 In the good faith context, see, eg, Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, 
[60]. 
46 A F H Loke, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint 
Ventures’ [1999] JBL 538, 547. 
47 This difficulty was noted by Lord Browne-Wilkinson when delivering the judgment of the 
Privy Council in Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 NZLR 289, [54]. 
48 Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104, 122-
123. 
49 A Phang, ‘Implied Terms in English Law - Some Recent Developments’ [1993] JBL 242, 
245-246. 
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employer/employee (implied term not to disclose secret processes), contracts 
for the sale of goods (implied terms of reasonable fitness and merchantable 
quality and that payment and delivery of goods are concurrent obligations),50 
contracts of lease between landlord and tenant (implied term that premises 
will be reasonably fit for habitation) and in contracts of carriage by sea (an 
implied term of seaworthiness).51  Notwithstanding these traditional classes, it 
is clear that the classes of contracts in which the law will imply terms is not 
closed.52 
 
The second requirement is to satisfy the test of necessity.53  This test 
emanates from what is regarded as the authoritative decision on the test for 
implication of terms in law (both in England and Australia),54 Liverpool City 
Council v Irwin.55  In this well-known decision, the issue for determination by 
the House of Lords was whether the Council, as landlord, was under any 
implied obligation to maintain and repair the common parts of the building 
which were in the Council’s control.  In a speech often cited as describing the 
test to be satisfied (if a term were to be implied, as a matter of law), Lord 
Wilberforce56 opined that ‘such obligation should be read into the contract as 
the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires, no more, no less: a test, in 
other words of necessity.’57  Applying this test, Lord Wilberforce held that 
there was an implied term whereby the landlord Council was obliged to take 
reasonable care to keep these areas in reasonable repair.58 
 
From subsequent Australian cases it is apparent that ‘necessity’ is commonly 
understood to mean that ‘unless such a term be implied, the enjoyment of the 
rights conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory, 
worthless, or, perhaps, be seriously undermined.’59  Notwithstanding this 
common formulation, a wider conception of the test of necessity is also 
apparent in certain decisions.  In these instances, wider policy reasons have 
been seen to support the implication of a contractual term as a matter of 
                                                 
50 Now codified by statute: see, eg, Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld). 
51 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 448; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v 
Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 487; Glanville Williams, ‘Language 
and the Law’ (1945) 61 LQR 403 as referred to in Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [165]. 
52 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 487 
(Hope JA). 
53 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10, 30 (Mason CJ). 
54 Albeit a decision which remains confusing given its myriad treatment of both the test and its 
application: Peden, above n 35, 70. 
55 [1977] AC 239. 
56 With whom Lord Fraser agreed: [1977] AC 239, 270. 
57 [1977] AC 239, 254. 
58 Ibid 256. 
59 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 450 (McHugh and Gummow JJ); 
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 103 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 124 (Gummow J).  An 
alternative way of describing the test of necessity is whether the term sought to be implied is 
necessary in contracts of the class to which the subject contract belongs in the sense that, 
without it, the whole basis of the contracts in the class would be rendered futile: Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 488 (Hope JA, 
Samuels and Priestley JJA agreeing). 
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law.60  That said, it has been recognised that the narrower conception of the 
test of necessity will address ‘the broad range of instances where the issue of 
such an implication ordinarily arises.’61   
 
This distinction between the two categories of implied terms, namely terms 
implied in fact and terms implied as a matter of law, may be critical when 
considering the implied obligation of good faith in the performance and 
enforcement of commercial contracts. 
 
For example, it may not be possible to imply a term of good faith based on 
business efficacy where the contract would be effective without it,62 where the 
term is not so obvious that it goes without saying63 or where the implication of 
the term would be inconsistent with an express term of a contract.  These 
potential difficulties in satisfying the requirements for an obligation of good 
faith to be implied, as a matter of fact, were foreseen by Priestley JA in 
Renard64 and they have proven to be significant obstacles.65  The difficulty 
being, as Peden notes, that it will be difficult to satisfy the strict requirements 
of the business efficacy test in circumstances where the contract can ‘work’ if 
the parties perform their contractual obligations in their own interests.66 
 
In stark contrast, due to the different basis for implication, even the presence 
of an inconsistent, express, contractual term may not necessarily operate as 
an impediment to the implication of a term of good faith in contractual 
performance and enforcement, as a matter of law.  Given this contrast, it is 
perhaps not surprising that there are instances where judges have implied a 
good faith obligation as a matter of law expressly due to ‘the difficulty of 
complying with the criteria for an implication in fact.’67 
 
2.1.1 Commercial Contracts – An Identifiable Class? 
                                                 
60 Policy reasons have been expressly articulated in the past, see, eg, Lister v Romford Ice 
[1957] AC 555, 576-579; Simonius Vischer & Co Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 NSWLR 322, 
348.  In the specific context of an implied obligation of good faith, Finn J has expressly 
acknowledged that considerations of public policy can and do have an overt role to play in 
some instances: Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 
ALR 1, 39. 
61 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1, 39. 
62 See, eg, South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177 
ALR 661. 
63 See, eg, Saxby Bridge Mortgages Pty Ltd v Saxby Bridge Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 433. 
64 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, 258. 
65 Once again demonstrated in Christopher John De Pasquale v The Australian Chess 
Federation Incorporation (AO 1325) [2000] ACTSC 94.  Also, in Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust 
Contracts Rep 90-143 Barrett J quickly dismissed the suggestion that an implied term of good 
faith arose on the grounds of presumed intention or business efficacy: at [60].  The answer to 
the question whether, an obligation of good faith, implied by law into the parties’ contract, had 
been breached, was more vexed. 
66 Peden, above n 35, 132. 
67 Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94, [52] (Steytler J) as 
referred to by Peden, above n 35, 133. 
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In good faith jurisprudence, the decision of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Burger King68 remains significant.  In this case the Court of Appeal 
cited the earlier decision of Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella69 with evident 
approval.  In both instances the Court of Appeal was dealing with a 
commercial contract and, in both instances, the court was prepared to imply a 
term of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement.  
Unfortunately, it seems the mere fact that a commercial contract was involved 
in both instances has resulted in these decisions being erroneously accepted 
as a precedent for a legally wider proposition.  The decision in Burger King70 
has been repeatedly cited by judges at first instance in New South Wales as 
authority for the proposition that a duty of good faith will be implied, as a 
matter of law, in all commercial contracts.71 
 
However, at no stage was this proposition expressly stated by the Court of 
Appeal72 in either Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella73 or Burger King.74  
Although the Court of Appeal in Burger King75 did state the two tests for 
implication of a contractual term as a matter of law,76 they merely seemed to 
satisfy themselves, in a very cursory manner, that the second test of necessity 
was met.77  The satisfaction (or otherwise) of the first test, that there should 
be a recognised class of contract, was not discussed.  The only comment 
made in this regard was that the contract in issue did not fall within the rubric 
of any traditional class of contract.78  The absence of any discussion of the 
satisfaction of the first test, and the limited and largely unhelpful discussion of 
the second test, militates against the view that this decision should be 
accepted as authority for the proposition that a duty of good faith will be 
implied, as a matter of law, in that class of contracts being commercial 
contracts per se. 
 
The veracity of this observation has been confirmed by a more recent 
decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal79 in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v 
                                                 
68 [2001] NSWCA 187.  
69 (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. 
70 [2001] NSWCA 187. 
71 See, eg, Apple Communications Ltd v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 635; State of 
New South Wales v Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 503; Overlook v Foxtel 
(2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Spira (2002) 174 FLR 
274; Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd v Cassegraine [2002] NSWSC 965; 
Softplay v Perpetual [2002] NSWSC 1059. 
72 As noted subsequently by a differently constituted New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [189], [191]. 
73 (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. 
74 [2001] NSWCA 187.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid [165]. 
77 Ibid [167]. 
78 Ibid [166]. 
79 Giles, Sheller and Ipp JJA. 
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Mobile Innovations Ltd.80  Mobile Innovations Ltd (‘Mobile’) had been 
appointed by Vodafone Pacific Ltd (‘Vodafone’) as a sole or exclusive direct 
marketing agent under a long term Agent Service Provider (‘ASP’) contract.  
Amongst other things, the question arose whether Vodafone was under an 
implied obligation to act in good faith in exercising its powers under the ASP 
contract, specifically the power of determining target levels for the acquisition 
of subscribers.  Although the Court of Appeal was ultimately content to 
assume, expressly without deciding, that there was such an implied 
obligation,81 some extremely pertinent observations were made concerning 
the class of contracts carrying the implied term of good faith as a legal 
incident. 
 
In discussing the earlier decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Burger King,82 Giles JA83 observed that the decision fell short of, indeed 
rejected, treating commercial contracts as a class of contracts carrying the 
implied term as a legal incident.84  Giles JA then observed: 
 
 I do not think the law has yet gone so far as to say that commercial contracts are a 
class of contracts carrying the implied terms as a legal incident, and the width and 
indeterminacy of the class of contracts would make it a large step.85 (emphasis 
added) 
 
This is not the first time that judicial doubt has been expressed concerning the 
selection of the class ‘commercial contracts’ to carry the implied term of good 
faith as a legal incident.  In Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd86 
Parker J similarly stated ‘I don’t find the notion of all commercial contracts 
particularly helpful or relevant.’87   
 
The decision in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd88 is significant.  
First, the New South Wales Court of Appeal89 is clearly seeking to distance 
itself from any suggestion that Burger King90 should be viewed as authority for 
the proposition that an implied obligation of good faith is a legal incident of all 
commercial contracts.  Secondly, the decision heralds the need for a careful 
consideration of contractual context when determining a class of contract that 
should attract the implied obligation of good faith as a legal incident.91  This 
                                                 
80 [2004] NSWCA 15. 
81 Unless excluded by express provision or because inconsistent with the terms of the 
contract: ibid [191]. 
82 [2001] NSWCA 187. 
83 Sheller and Ipp JJA concurred with the judgment delivered by Giles JA. 
84 Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [189]. 
85 Ibid [191]. 
86 (2001) 24 WAR 382. 
87 Ibid [21]. 
88 [2004] NSWCA 15. 
89 A court which has championed the good faith cause. 
90 [2001] NSWCA 187. 
91 To ensure the class selected is not too broad in its width or indeterminant. 
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judicial caution has been subsequently echoed both in New South Wales92 
and in other jurisdictions93 where the appropriateness of good faith being 
implied an incident of all commercial contracts has been openly questioned. 
 
2.2 The Meaning of ‘Good Faith’? 
 
It is one thing to say that an obligation of good faith may be implied in certain 
commercial contracts; however, there remains the significant difficulty94 of 
giving meaning to the implied obligation.95 
 
There can be no doubt that a universally accepted definition of the term ‘good 
faith’ has proved elusive in the Australian context,96 as elsewhere.97  Some 
consider it unlikely that the term has a fixed meaning.98  The fact that no one 
satisfactory definition has evolved should not be viewed as surprising.  
Perhaps like other fundamental terms applied to human conduct such as 
‘honesty’ or ‘malice’,99 ‘good faith’ (in a similar manner to ‘unconscionability’) 
is a term ‘better described than defined’.100 
                                                 
92 See, eg, Australian Hotels Association (NSW) v TAB Ltd [2006] NSWSC 293, [78]; Maitland 
Main Collieries Pty Ltd v Xstrata Mt Owen Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1235, [56]; Ingot Capital 
Investments v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets [No 6] [2007] NSWSC 124, [594].  Cf 
Mangrove Mountain Quarries Pty Ltd v Barlow [2007] NSWSC 492, [27]. 
93 See, eg, Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 
228, [25]; In Kendells (NSW) Pty Ltd (In Liq) Kendell v Sweeney [2005] QSC 64, [58] – [59]. 
94 The problems in defining ‘good faith’ were canvassed in Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield 
Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236. 
95 There is a wealth of literature concerning the meaning of the term ‘good faith’.  Reference 
may be made to numerous Australian articles, see, eg, J W Carter and M P Furmston, ‘Good 
Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts’ (1994) 8 JCL 1 (part 1); (1994) 8 JCL 93 
(part 2); H K Lucke, ‘Good Faith and Contractual Performance’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on 
Contract (1987) 155; E Maloney, ‘Contracts and the Concept of Good Faith’ (1993) 29 ACLN 
32; A F Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’ (2000) 116 
LQR 66; J M Paterson, ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts? A Franchising Case Study’ 
(2001) 29(4) ABLR 270; E Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (2003); S M 
Waddams, ‘Good Faith, Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations’ (1995) 9 JCL 55; D 
Yates, ‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1995) 8 JCL 145.  For an English approach, see, eg, R 
Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context 
(1999).  For Canadian commentary, see, eg, M G Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Contract 
Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 Canadian BLJ 385; D Stack, ‘The Two 
Standards of Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law’ (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law Review 
201.  In the American context, see, eg, S J Burton, ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law 
Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ (1980) 94 Harv Law Review 369; R S Summers, ‘Good Faith 
in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) 
54 Virginia L Rev 195; R S Summers, ‘The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization’ (1982) 67 Cornell Law Review 810. 
96 A Baron, ‘Good Faith’ and Construction Contracts - From Small Acorns Large Oaks Grow’ 
(2002) 22 Aust Bar Rev 54, 54. 
97 In the European context, it has been noted that the term ‘good faith’ is notoriously difficult to 
define: James Gordley, ‘Good Faith in Contract Law in the Medieval Ius Commune’ in 
Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds), Good Faith in European Contract Law 
(2000) 93, 93. 
98 Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 204 ALR 761, 783-785. 
99 J F O’Connor, Good Faith in English Law (1990) 10. 
100 The terminology used by Mahoney JA to describe unconscionability in Antonovic v Volker 
(1986) 7 NSWLR 151, 165: referred to by Mason, above n 2, 89.  Some even doubt that the 
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Even in countries with a large volume of good faith jurisprudence and a 
considerable body of academic writing, the meaning of the term has proved 
elusive.  In their four volume commentary on the requirement of good faith in 
the UCC, White and Summers wryly observe ‘we caution anyone who is 
confident about the meaning of good faith to reconsider.’101  Consistent with 
this observation, there is a range of academic viewpoints in the United States 
as to the meaning of the good faith obligation.102  By way of example, 
consistent with a conceptualisation that eschews a definitional approach,103 
Professor Summers104 described the duty of good faith as an ‘excluder’.  
According to Summers’ excluder analysis,105 the phrase ‘good faith’, 
 
[i]s a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude 
a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.  In a particular context the phrase 
takes on specific meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific 
form of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.106 
 
Of course, excluder analysis begets the question: can you define ‘bad faith’ or 
merely provide examples of bad faith behaviour?  In discussing difficulties of 
this type, Iglesias refers to an instance where one court characterised bad 
faith in the same manner that US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart 
famously defined pornography: ‘I know it when I see it.’107 
 
Given the division of opinion evident in wider good faith jurisprudence from 
the United States, it is perhaps not surprising that, in Renard,108 Priestley JA 
made no attempt to define ‘good faith’.  Priestley JA simply approved the 
‘excluder’ analysis of Professor Summers.109  However, not all Australian 
judges or commentators have limited themselves to the excluder analysis that 
Priestley JA considered to be quite ‘workable’.110  In South Sydney District 
Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd,111 Finn J opined that ‘good faith’ 
had an identifiable meaning.  The implication of a term of good faith was 
                                                                                                                                            
term ‘good faith’ can be defined: Steyn J, ‘The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in 
Contract Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy?’ [1991] Denning LJ 131, 140. 
101 Uniform Commercial Code, Vol 1 (4th ed, 1995) 187 as referred to by P Finn, ‘Equity and 
Commercial Contracts: A Comment’ (2001) AMPLA Yearbook 414, 420. 
102 E Webb, ‘The Scope of the Implied Duty of Good Faith - Lessons from Commercial and 
Retail Leasing Cases’ (2001) 9 APLJ 1, 4. 
103 Summers (1982), above n 95, 830. 
104 Writing in the context of the UCC. 
105 An analysis which Summers suggests was first articulated by philosophers, including 
Aristotle and J L Austin: Summers (1982), above n 95, 827. 
106 Summers (1968), above n 95, 199. 
107 J Iglesias, ‘Comment: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to 
Franchises’ (2004) 40 Hous L Rev 1423, [1428]. 
108 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
109 Summers (1968), above n 95, 196.  The same approach was adopted by Byrne J in Far 
Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310, [124].  The New South Wales 
Court of Appeal also cited the excluder analysis in Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [150]. 
110 Renard (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, 266. 
111 (2000) 177 ALR 661. 
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considered to require, at least, that the parties be bound to ‘the spirit of the 
bargain’ and not to render illusory contractual entitlements.112  Other members 
of the judiciary and academic commentators have favoured the view that good 
faith operates as a restraint on self-interest at least to the extent that this is 
unconscionable.113 
 
Sir Anthony Mason has observed114 that good faith may embrace no less than 
three related notions: an obligation on the parties to cooperate in achieving 
the contractual objects (loyalty to the promise itself),115 compliance with 
honest standards of conduct116 and compliance with standards of conduct 
which are reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties.117  As 
recently noted by Barrett J, the more substantial and separate meaning of the 
duty of good faith would seem to lie in the second and third limbs of Sir 
Anthony’s formulation.118  As these limbs operate to exclude behaviour that 
exhibits symptoms of ‘bad faith’ they may be seen as giving effect to the 
excluder analysis whilst also seeking to give the term ‘good faith’ an 
identifiable meaning.  Sir Anthony Mason’s approach was cited with approval 
by Finn J in Hughes119 and by Sheller JA in Alcatel Australia Ltd v 
Scarcella.120  More recently, this approach was also cited with evident 
approval by the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Sheller, Beazley and 
Stein JJA) in Burger King.121  However, notwithstanding this support, no 
definition of ‘good faith’ has been uniformly agreed upon122 with the cases 
demonstrating a ‘regrettable lack of uniformity’.123 
 
2.3 Basis of the Obligation 
 
The lack of a uniformly agreed definition highlights the significance that must 
be attached, as in the United States, to the underlying basis of the implied 
good faith obligation.124  Is the underlying basis of the obligation the 
                                                 
112 Ibid [426]. 
113 See, eg, Einstein J in Aiton Australia Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236, 263-265 
adopting an approach similar to J Stapleton, [2000] Current Legal Problems 1, 5-6.  Seddon 
and Ellinghaus make the comment that such an approach may make it difficult to distinguish 
good faith from unconscionable conduct: N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire & 
Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Aust ed, 2002) 422. 
114 Mason, above n 7, 69. 
115 A duty of cooperation of the Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251 variety, as recently 
affirmed by the High Court in Peters (WA) Ltd v Petersville (2001) 75 ALJR 1385. 
116 A subjective requirement. 
117 For a discussion of the issue whether the good faith obligation is tantamount to an 
obligation to act reasonably in contractual performance and enforcement, see below. 
118 Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [64]. 
119 (1997) 146 ALR 1, 37. 
120 (1998) 44 NSWLR 349, 367. 
121 [2001] NSWCA 187, [169]-[171]. 
122 Peden, above n 35, 159. 
123 Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [192]. 
124 The underlying basis of the good faith obligation will also be critical in the context of 
potential contractual exclusion of the implied obligation. 
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reasonable expectations or interests of the contractual parties or is it a much 
more broadly based notion of community standards?125 
 
2.3.1 Reasonable Expectations or Community Standards? 
 
In the past, there is no doubt that a number of academic commentators, who 
supported the express recognition of an implied obligation of good faith in 
Australian contract law, commonly envisaged the obligation being based on 
‘generalised moral standards of fairness, loyalty or cooperation.  This 
approach [was] justified as reflecting community sentiments or ideals126 about 
the desirable values in a contractual relationship.’127  The same approach 
(with an appeal to moral standards) was reflected in the invocation of 
community expectations by Priestley JA in Renard.128 
 
Interestingly, there is very little judicial support for this approach in more 
recent Australian decisions.  In the same way that a good faith obligation 
allegedly centred on broad moral standards has found less explicit support in 
decisions in the United States,129 the prevailing trend of recent Australian 
lower court authority130 indicates that the content of the good faith obligation is 
increasingly likely to be based on the reasonable expectations or legitimate 
interests of the contractual parties.131  Serving as but one example, the final 
conclusions of Barrett J in Overlook v Foxtel132 are instructive: 
 
Foxtel did not act in a capricious way: on the contrary, its action was deliberate and 
reasoned and had both a rational basis and an objective explanation.  Furthermore, 
the action was not purely selfish and destructive of the position of Overlook or such 
as to cause Overlook’s rights to become nugatory, worthless or seriously undermined 
… Foxtel’s actions involved no departure from standards of conduct which are 
honest, as well as being reasonable having regard to the parties’ interests.133 
 
                                                 
125 For further discussion of this particular issue, refer to Paterson, above n 95. 
126 Being the same broad community expectations that are arguably exemplified in legislative 
initiatives such as s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): W D Duncan, ‘The 
Implication of a Term of Good Faith in Commercial Leases’ (2002) 9 APLJ 209, 216. 
127 J M Paterson, ‘Limits on a Lender’s Right to Repayment on Demand: Construction, 
Implication and Good Faith?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 258, 261. 
128 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, 268. 
129 J M Paterson, ‘Duty of Good Faith Does it Have a Place in Contract Law?’ (2000) 74 LIJ 
47, 49. 
130 See, eg, Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349, 367; Overlook v Foxtel 
(2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [83].  In Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd 
(2001) 24 WAR 382, Parker J referred to a ‘reasonable standard of conduct having regard to 
the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant.’: at [39]. 
131 There is also academic support for this approach given that it abdicates an approach to 
the implication of good faith based on ‘some transcendent vision of fair dealing’: Paterson, 
above n 127, 272. 
132 (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143. 
133 Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [83]. 
 17
2.3.2 Legitimate Interests 
 
In an all but identical vein to treating the parties’ reasonable expectations as 
the underlying basis, the linkage of the basis of the good faith obligation to the 
legitimate interests of the contractual parties also enjoys a substantial line of 
academic and judicial support.  Finn was one of the first Australian 
commentators to equate a duty to act in good faith with a positive requirement 
to have regard to the other contractual party’s legitimate interests.134  In turn 
this was in recognition of the power that may be wielded within a contractual 
relationship:  
 
 Relationships, whatever their type, inevitably give to one or both parties the de facto 
 capacity to affect adversely the interests of the other.  Expectations can be thwarted, 
 obligations ignored, vulnerability exploited, legitimate interests disregarded, powers 
 exercised harshly, and so on.135 
 
Lubbe has also suggested that good faith requires that a measure of 
recognition and respect be afforded to the legitimate interests of the other 
party.136  Peden also proposes a meaning of good faith as a requirement that 
regard be had of the other party’s interests137 without subordinating one’s own 
interests.138  Although not in the context of a good faith claim, a similar judicial 
approach was taken by Mason J139 in Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
Surgical Corp140 where he recognised an obligation upon a defendant to have 
due regard to the plaintiff’s interests.141  This theme was further developed by 
Sir Anthony Mason when he noted, writing extrajudicially: 
 
 A contract may confer power on a contracting party in terms wider than are necessary for 
 the protection of the legitimate interests of that party.  In such a case, the courts will 
 interpret the power as not extending to action proposed by the party in whom the power is 
 vested when that action exceeds what is necessary for the protection of the party’s 
 legitimate interests.142 
 
                                                 
134 P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(1989) 4 as referred to by J W Carter and M P Furmston, ‘Good Faith and Fairness in the 
Negotiation of Contracts Part 1’ (1994) 8 JCL 1, 6. 
135 P Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 MULR 87, 95. 
136 Gerhard Lubbe, ‘Bona Fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Kontraktereg (1990) 1 Stellenbosch LR 7 as referred to by Dale Hutchison, ‘Good Faith in the 
South African Law of Contract’ in R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in 
Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 213, 232. 
137 Peden, above n 35, 159. 
138 Ibid 160.  Peden, in turn, cites J W Carter and M P Furmston, ‘Good Faith and Fairness in 
the Negotiation of Contracts Part 1’ (1994) 8 JCL 1, 6. 
139 In a dissenting judgment in so far as it recognised a fiduciary duty (albeit a fiduciary duty 
that was limited in its scope). 
140 (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
141 Ibid 101. 
142 Mason, above n 7, 76. 
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More recently, this approach has received the express support of Barratt J 
who opined that good faith involves ‘a duty to recognise and to have due 
regard to the legitimate interests of both the parties in the enjoyment of the 
fruits of the contract as delineated by its terms.’143 
 
For the purposes of this paper, it is suggested that the difference between 
‘reasonable expectations’ and ‘legitimate interests’ as the underlying basis of 
the implied obligation of good faith is mere semantics.  Considerable support 
for this proposition is garnered from the approach of Finn J to use these two 
terms interchangeably.144  Yee also notes that the determination of legitimate 
interests must be substantially tied to reasonable expectations of contractual 
behaviour.145  For this reason, from this point on, any individual reference in 
this research to the term ‘reasonable expectations’ is to be treated as being 
synonymous with the term ‘legitimate interests’.  What is most significant for 
this research is the highlighted trend to use these bases in clear preference to 
Priestley JA’s invocation of ‘community expectations’. 
 
Unfortunately, the recognition of the parties’ reasonable expectations, as the 
generally prevailing basis of the good faith obligation in Australia, does not 
mean that the content of the obligation can be stated with absolute certainty.  
As with the Restatement, there seems little doubt that the content of the good 
faith obligation in any particular instance will depend on the ‘circumstances of 
the case and upon the context of the whole of the contract.’146  In this regard, 
the observation has been made147 that the content of the good faith obligation 
is perhaps best determined on a case by case basis using the broad 
discretion of the trial judge.148  While individual cases will provide guidance, 
the critical issue will be the reasonable expectations that are engendered in 
the relevant contractual context.  The parties’ contractual relationship is the 
source from which the implied good faith obligation draws its content.149  This 
approach is not without its advantages. 
 
                                                 
143 Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [67].  The same approach was 
adopted by Hasluck J in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, 
[388] and by Dodds-Stretton J in Varangian v OFM Capital Limited [2003] VSC 444, [175].  
Consistent with the need to have regard to the interests of both parties, in Hoppers Crossing 
Club Ltd v Tattersalls Gaming Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 114, Kaye J opined that the implied term of 
good faith ‘would not operate so as to preclude the right of a party to act in pursuit of its own 
legitimate commercial interests.’: at [25]. 
144 Notwithstanding that Finn J has recently expressed a preference for an approach based 
on reasonable expectations: Finn J, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealings and ‘Boats Against the 
Current’’ (Paper presented at the Second Biennial Conference on the Law of Obligations, 
Melbourne, 16 July 2004) 10. 
145 W P Yee, ‘Protecting Parties’ Reasonable Expectations: A General Principle of Good 
Faith’ [2001] 1(2) OUCLJ 195, 223. 
146 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [148].  See also S K 
O’Byrne, ‘Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent Developments’ (1995) 74 Canadian 
Bar Review 70, 73. 
147 In the context of a requirement that the parties utilise dispute resolution procedures in 
good faith. 
148 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236, [129] (Einstein J). 
149 Forklift Engineering Australia Pty Ltd v Powerlift (Nissan) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 443. 
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To use the words of Finn J, an approach of this type150 
 
has the virtue of conditioning the inquiry by reference to the actual circumstances of a 
given relationship: its nature, its terms, its contemplated purposes, the relative 
positions of the parties, the actual progress of the relationship, its business setting, 
the reasons for a decision or action taken, the consequences of the decision or 
action, and so on.  Such is the material from which one will determine what, in the 
circumstances, one party is reasonably entitled to expect of the decision or action of 
the other. … If the inquiry so raised is individualized, it is neither amorphous or 
unmanageable.  Its focus ordinarily will be no more than whether one party’s conduct 
is consistent with (or faithful to) the relationship of the parties that is evidenced by 
their contract.151 
 
2.4 Is the Good Faith Obligation Tantamount to an Obligation to act 
 Reasonably in Contractual Performance and Enforcement? 
 
There has been a tendency by some members of the Australian judiciary to 
equate the notions of good faith and reasonableness.152  Notwithstanding this 
tendency, in practice, the application of the good faith standard has not been 
as onerous as would be expected if good faith were truly equated with a 
requirement of contractual behaviour that would be objectively regarded as 
reasonable.153  In other words, in its practical application, the good faith 
obligation has not been considered to be breached simply because a party to 
a contract has acted in a manner that could be objectively viewed as 
unreasonable.  A few examples will serve to demonstrate this proposition. 
 
The mere fact that the exercise of a contractual right (for example a right to 
terminate) happened to accord with the innocent party’s commercial 
objectives has not been regarded as sufficient to establish bad faith.154  
Indeed it has been noted that the implied duty of good faith does not require a 
party to subordinate its contractual rights.155  Similarly, Finkelstein J made the 
point in Garry Rogers Motors Aust Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd156 that the 
presence of an implied term of good faith does not restrict a party acting so as 
to promote its own ‘legitimate interests’.157  If an objective requirement of 
acting in a contractually reasonable manner were truly part of the good faith 
standard there would be an expectation that these judicial comments would 
be subject to a further ‘reasonableness’ caveat which has not been apparent. 
 
                                                 
150 Based on reasonable expectations. 
151 Finn, above n 144, 10-11. 
152 As noted by Hasluck J in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 
286, [388]. 
153 As noted by Stapleton, a requirement of good faith is not nearly as onerous as a 
requirement of objectively reasonable behaviour: J Stapleton, ‘Good Faith in Private Law’ 
(1999) 52 CLP 1, 8. 
154 Refer to comments to this effect by Gyles J in Asia Television Ltd v Yau’s Entertainment 
Pty Ltd (2000) 48 IPR 283, [77]. 
155 Per Barrett J in Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [65]. 
156 (1999) ATPR 41-703. 
157 Ibid [37].  This approach was recently cited with approval by Kaye J in Hoppers Crossing 
Club Ltd v Tattersalls Gaming Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 114, [25]. 
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From the available decisions, the conclusion that may be drawn is that, to act 
reasonably, is to act in good faith.158  This very point was made by Finkelstein 
J in Garry Rogers Motors Aust Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd159 when His 
Honour observed that ‘provided the party exercising the power acts 
reasonably in all the circumstances the duty to act fairly and in good faith will 
ordinarily be satisfied.’160  However, to act unreasonably, is not, of itself, 
tantamount to a failure to act in good faith due to a party’s right to have regard 
to its own interests.  ‘A party may have behaved in good faith, yet still have 
behaved unreasonably.’161 
 
For these reasons, it is hard not to agree with the observation that the judicial 
equation of ‘an obligation of reasonableness and one of good faith is 
misconceived’162 and further that ‘the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Burger King is incorrect in assimilating good faith with objective 
reasonableness, as reasonableness sets too high a standard.’163  The better 
view is that, although there may be a degree of overlap in their content, the 
terms ‘unreasonableness’ and ‘lack of good faith’ should continue to be 
employed in different contexts and should not be treated as co-extensive in 
their connotations.164 
 
2.5 Should Good Faith be Equated to a Fiduciary Standard?  What is 
 the Relevance of Self-Interest? 
 
The possibility of good faith being equated to a fiduciary standard has raised 
concerns for certain commentators165 and is, undoubtedly, an issue that 
requires clarification.166  By way of background, in the 1980s it was not 
uncommon for Australian commercial plaintiffs to allege that the relationship 
was a fiduciary one, rather than one simply regulated by the terms of the 
contract, either express or implied.  The motivation for a fiduciary plea was 
often the desire to obtain a gain-based remedy167 rather than a loss-based 
remedy.168  However, this ‘great experiment’169 was largely defused by the 
High Court.  In Breen v Williams170 the High Court observed that a general 
                                                 
158 Lay v Alliswell Pty Ltd (2002) V Conv R 54-651, [31]. 
159 (1999) ATPR 41-703. 
160 Garry Rogers Motors Aust Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-703, [37]. 
161 Peden, above n 35, 164. 
162 Ibid 163. 
163 Ibid 184. 
164 An observation consistent with that of Hasluck J in Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v 
Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [352]. 
165 See, eg, J W Carter and A Stewart, ‘Interpretation, Good Faith and the “True Meaning” of 
Contracts: The Royal Botanic Decision’ (2002) 18 JCL 182, 194. 
166 Ibid. 
167 This was the motivation for the plea in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp 
(1984) 156 CLR 41. 
168 Loke, above n 46, 539. 
169 Tyrone M Carlin, ‘The Rise (and Fall?) of Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual 
Performance in Australia’ (2002) 25(1) UNSWLJ 99, 101. 
170 (1996) 186 CLR 71. 
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fiduciary relationship will not arise simply due to a contractual relationship 
having some fiduciary aspects.  Due to this judicial approach, Australia has 
been kept relatively immune from ‘an unprincipled penetration of the fiduciary 
principle into ordinary contractual dealings.’171 
 
While it is understandable that a plaintiff may wish to pursue a fiduciary 
claim,172 is it correct to regard the concepts of good faith and fiduciary 
obligations as being closely intertwined?  Although it is clear that the 
categories of fiduciary relationships are not closed,173 the central nature of a 
fiduciary relationship must be borne in mind: 
 
The critical feature of these [i.e. fiduciary] relationships is that the fiduciary 
undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in 
the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other 
person in a legal or practical sense.  The relationship between the parties is therefore 
one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion 
to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the 
fiduciary of his position.174 
 
As noted by Meagher, Heydon and Leeming: 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is that its essence, or 
purpose, is to serve exclusively the interests of a person or group of persons; or, to 
put it negatively, it is a relationship in which the parties are not each free to pursue 
their separate interests.175 
 
Despite concerns that the two concepts of good faith and fiduciary obligations 
may somehow be interwoven, it is clear from a number of Australian decisions 
concerning good faith that an allegation of self-interest (that would not be 
permissible in a fiduciary relationship) will not be sufficient, of itself, to sustain 
a claim based on breach of the good faith obligation.  A clear example is 
provided by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Burger King176 when it 
was noted: 
 
That does not mean that BKC is not entitled to have regard only to its own legitimate 
interests in exercising its discretion.  However, it must not do so for a purpose 
extraneous to the contract - for example, by withholding financial or operational 
approval where there is no basis to do so, so as to thwart HJPL’s rights under the 
contract.177 
 
                                                 
171 P Finn, ‘Contract and the Fiduciary Principle’ (1989) 12 UNSWLJ 76, 82.  Empirical 
analysis of decisions since Breen v Williams suggests that those seeking to impose fiduciary 
standards outside recognised categories will be disappointed: Carlin, above n 169, 102. 
172 For some of the practical and procedural advantages of a fiduciary claim refer to Loke, 
above n 46, 539-541. 
173 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 (Gibbs 
CJ), 96-97 (Mason J), 141-142 (Dawson J). 
174 Ibid 96-97 (Mason J). 
175 R P Meagher, J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: 
Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002) 158. 
176 [2001] NSWCA 187. 
177 Ibid [185]. 
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The issue was directly addressed by Barratt J in Overlook v Foxtel178 when 
discussing the implied obligation of good faith: 
 
But no party is fixed with the duty to subordinate self-interest entirely which is the lot 
of the fiduciary … The duty is not to prefer the interests of the other contracting party.  
It is, rather, a duty to recognise and to have due regard to the legitimate interests of 
both the parties in the enjoyment of the fruits of the contract as delineated by its 
terms.179 
 
As these quotations clearly indicate, contractual behaviour that would not be 
permissible in a fiduciary relationship will not necessarily infringe an implied 
obligation of good faith as the fiduciary standard is the highest protective 
responsibility which the law imposes on consensual relationships.180   
 
In essence, to equate good faith with a fiduciary standard is to make a 
fundamental mistake, both as to the incidence and the content of the two 
obligations.  As noted, to invoke proscriptive, fiduciary duties is to seek the 
highest degree of protective responsibility.181  This level of protective 
responsibility will be a rarity in commercial relationships by contrast to implied 
obligations of good faith which will frequently arise.  However, although far 
more frequent in their occurrence, the obligations arising due to an implied 
obligation of good faith are far less onerous than those owed in a fiduciary 
relationship.182 
 
2.6 What Correlation is There (if any) Between Good Faith and 
 Equitable and/or Statutory Unconscionability? 
 
Certain academics seek to equate the notions of good faith and 
unconscionability183 or, at the very least, seek to suggest that the standard of 
conduct which will result in a breach of the implied duty of good faith is 
unconscionability.184  This approach is not without judicial support.  In 
Renard,185 Priestley JA referred to the close association of ideas between the 
terms unreasonableness, lack of good faith and unconscionability.186  In 
                                                 
178 (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143. 
179 Ibid [67]. 
180 Loke, above n 46, 542. 
181 Loke, above n 46, 544. 
182 Consistent with the observation of Hollingworth J in Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v 
Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2004] VSC 477, [126] that good faith imposes a narrower and 
less onerous standard than that required of fiduciaries. 
183 See, eg, Stapleton, above n 153.  Clough also argues that there is a trend to a general 
duty of good faith based upon a broad notion of unconscionability: D Clough, ‘Trends in the 
Law of Unconscionability’ (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 34.  Cf Finn who describes the good faith 
standard as falling between the unconscionability standard and the fiduciary standard: see P 
D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989) 3-4 
(referred to by Peter Heffey, Jeannie Paterson and Andrew Robertson, Principles of Contract 
Law (2002) 262). 
184 E Webb, ‘The Scope of the Implied Duty of Good Faith – Lessons from Commercial and 
Retail Leasing Cases’ (2001) 9 APLJ 1, 3. 
185 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
186 Ibid 265. 
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Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella187 the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
seemed to equate unconscionability with a breach of the good faith 
obligation.188  In a similar manner, in Dickson Property Management Services 
Pty Ltd v Centro Property Management (Vic) Pty Ltd189 it was noted that the 
implied obligation of good faith may be breached if the actions were 
unreasonable, capricious or unconscionable.190  By way of a final example, in 
Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd191 Hasluck J suggested that 
good faith was probably no more than a prohibition on acting 
unconscionably.192 
 
2.6.1 Different Meanings of the Term ‘Unconscionability’ 
 
A difficulty with the term ‘unconscionability’ is that it is not employed by either 
academics or the judiciary in a uniform manner.193  Perhaps influenced by 
statutory developments dealing with unconscionable conduct,194 it is not 
uncommon in this regard for academics to ascribe their own broad meanings 
to the term ‘unconscionability’.  For example, one academic approach seeks 
to delineate the boundaries of good faith conduct by suggesting that 
contractual self-interest may be pursued to a point where it becomes 
unconscionable for certain specific reasons.195  
 
By way of judicial example, Priestley JA in Renard196 opined that statutes 
proscribing unfair and unconscionable transactions could be used to bolster 
the development of a common law good faith obligation.197  Clearly in this 
instance, the term ‘unconscionability’ was not being used by Priestley JA198 to 
indicate the specific, equitable doctrine but rather the broader, generic 
meaning of unconscionability, being conduct that is regarded, in equity, as 
being against conscience, thus providing the basis for equitable intervention in 
a variety of circumstances.  It is suggested, with respect, that the use of the 
broader, generic meaning of ‘unconscionability’ has merely created 
                                                 
187 (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. 
188 Ibid 369. 
189 (2000) 180 ALR 485. 
190 (2000) 180 ALR 485, 487. 
191 [2002] WASC 286. 
192 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [372]. 
193 In the context of the debate concerning discretionary remedialism, the word 
‘unconscionable’ has been described as so unspecific that it simply conceals private and 
intuitive evaluation: P Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 
UWALRev 1, 16-17. 
194 See below. 
195 Stapleton, above n 153, 7-8.  Clough also expressly gives unconscionability a much 
broader meaning than that traditionally ascribed in equity: Clough, above n 183, 53-54. 
196 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
197 Ibid 268. 
198 Writing extra-judicially, Priestley JA clearly distinguished good faith and unconscionability: 
Hon J Priestley, ‘Contract - The Burgeoning Maelstrom’ (1988) 1 JCL 15, 19-22, 28-29 (as 
referred to by Peden, above n 2, 169).  See, also, E Peden, ‘Contractual Good Faith: Can 
Australia Benefit From the American Experience?’ (2003) 15 Bond LR 175, 189. 
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unnecessary confusion in the good faith debate.  This confusion largely 
disappears when the term ‘unconscionability’ is used to refer to the specific 
equitable doctrine that is recognised in its own right.  The statutory treatment 
of unconscionability is considered separately. 
 
2.6.2 The Equitable Doctrine of Unconscionability  
 
The longstanding equitable doctrine of unconscionability was ‘invigorated’199 
by the High Court in Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio.200  As stated by 
Mason CJ, relief will be available where: 
 
a party makes unconscientious use of his superior position or bargaining power to the 
detriment of a party who suffers from some special disability or is placed in some 
special situation of disadvantage ... the will of the innocent party, even if independent 
and voluntary … is the result of the disadvantageous position in which he is placed 
and of the other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that position.201 
 
In these circumstances, ‘an onus is cast upon the stronger party to show the 
transaction was fair, just and reasonable.’202  The equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability is intended to preclude advantage being taken of a person 
labouring under a disability such as, but not limited to, ‘poverty or need of any 
kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or 
lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or 
explanation is necessary.’203  The limitations of the equitable doctrine were 
explicitly acknowledged by the High Court in Louth v Diprose:204 
 
Although the concept of unconscionability has been expressed in fairly wide terms, 
the courts are exercising an equitable jurisdiction according to recognised principles.  
They are not armed with a general power to set aside bargains simply because, in the 
eyes of the judges, they appear to be unfair, harsh or unconscionable.205 
 
Given this limitation, and the attendant requirement of a special (or serious) 
disadvantage, it is submitted that the specific equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability may be clearly distinguished from the common law implied 
obligation of good faith, as it may impact upon the performance and 
enforcement of commercial contracts.  As exemplified by Commercial Bank of 
Australia v Amadio,206 the focus of the equitable doctrine of unconscionability 
is upon procedural or constitutional disability207 arising at, or prior to, the time 
                                                 
199 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Changing the Law in a Changing Society’ (1993) 67 ALJ 568, 571. 
200 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
201 Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 461 
202 Ibid 474 (Deane J). 
203 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, 405 (Fullagar J). 
204 (1992) 175 CLR 362. 
205 Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621, 654 (Toohey J). 
206 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
207 Mistaken commercial judgment, without more, will not constitute a constitutional disability: 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 189 
ALR 76, [64]-[65]. 
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of contract formation as it impacts on whether a contract may be set aside.208  
Consistent with the observation that the equitable doctrine does not focus on 
substantive unconscionability,209 the equitable doctrine falls to be considered 
in the formation of a contract rather than its termination.210  As demonstrated 
by Tri-Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd,211 
the equitable doctrine of unconscionability will not generally have any 
application to the conduct of parties occurring after the formation of an 
ongoing contractual relationship.212  In contrast, the province of the implied 
obligation of good faith is to temper the pursuit of self-interest following 
contract formation. 
 
Further, even in the context of contract formation, the specific equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability is less likely to have application to parties to 
arm’s length commercial transactions as the requisite ‘special disability’ will be 
infrequently present and parties will often have professional assistance.213  In 
Overlook v Foxtel214 a claim based on the equitable doctrine was raised, 
amongst others, in a commercial context.  The claim was quickly dismissed:  
 
It can be said at once that there is no scope for the operation of these principles in 
the present case of a contract negotiated at arm’s length between corporations 
represented by commercial negotiators … and having the active and ongoing 
assistance of their respective lawyers.  To the extent that a claim based on ordinary 
equitable notions of unconscionable dealing is seriously asserted by Overlook, it 
simply cannot be sustained in the particular commercial context.215 
 
In contrast, the good faith obligation in contractual performance and 
enforcement will frequently be implied in contracts involving arm’s length 
transactions, often between sophisticated businesspersons.216  Unlike the 
equitable doctrine of unconscionability, there is scope for the operation of the 
implied obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement 
regardless of the relative bargaining strengths of the parties to the commercial 
contract. 
 
                                                 
208 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 
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At an international level, it is noteworthy that in both the Principles of 
European Contract Law and the Unidroit Principles 2004, in addition to the 
good faith duty, there are quite separate provisions dealing with the issue of 
unconscionability.  Cognisant of these international provisions, Finn has 
observed that the unconscionable dealings doctrine ‘cannot be seen as a 
substitute for the good faith and fair dealing obligation itself.’217  Similarly, in 
the United States, where the UCC also has separate provisions addressing 
unconscionability,218 Burton has noted that the good faith performance 
doctrine should be sharply distinguished from the doctrine of 
unconscionability.219  It is suggested, with respect, that these sentiments are 
equally applicable in the Australian context, where a sharp distinction should 
be drawn between the equitable doctrine of unconscionability and common 
law obligation of good faith for the reasons outlined. 
 
Having made this distinction, it is still necessary to consider separately the 
possible intersection between the broader statutory treatment of 
unconscionability and the common law implied obligation of good faith. 
 
2.6.3 Statutory Unconscionability 
 
One of the most well known statutory provisions dealing with 
unconscionability220 is s 51AC(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).   
 
In determining if a supplier or acquirer has engaged in unconscionable 
conduct for the purposes of these sections, the court is entitled to have regard 
to a non-exhaustive list of matters as specified in s 51AC(3).  Given the 
breadth of this list of matters, it has been accepted that s 51AC is not limited 
to the equitable doctrine of unconscionability of the Commercial Bank of 
Australia v Amadio221 type222 and is wider than the concept of unconscionable 
conduct ‘within the meaning of the unwritten law … ’ as regulated by s 51AA 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).223  The wording of the section is clearly 
intended to prohibit broadly unconscionable conduct in the range of 
transactions to which it is applicable.224 
 
                                                 
217 Finn, above n 101, 419. 
218 UCC 2-302 (1) provides (in part): If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract. 
219 Burton, above n 95, 371. 
220 There are many other statutory provisions, see, eg, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s12CC; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 46B(1). 
221 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
222 See, eg, Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [361]. 
223 See, eg, Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd v Lenard’s Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1225, [219].  Section 
51AA does not apply to conduct that is prohibited by s 51AB or s 51AC: Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) s 51AA(2). 
224 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [361]. 
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One of the listed matters that the court may have regard to,225 is the extent to 
which the supplier or acquirer acted in good faith.226  There is no definition in 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) of the term ‘good faith’.  One commentator 
has even observed that s 51AC has thrust a good faith obligation on us by 
stealth!227  A key issue in the application of the provision will be whether the 
test of ‘good faith’ is subjective, objective, or possibly an amalgam of both.  
Unfortunately as a matter of statutory interpretation, as Corones has 
observed, having regard to the other factors set out in s 51AC(3) and (4) it is 
not possible to reach a conclusion on this issue.228 
 
Finn suggests that the absence of the additional words ‘and fair dealing’ after 
the words ‘good faith’ may limit the operation of good faith in this particular 
statutory context to subjective considerations of honesty only, rather than the 
additional obligation of requiring conduct that may be considered objectively 
to be reasonable.229  In the more general good faith context, Sir Anthony 
Mason has also drawn attention to the added significance of the words ‘fair 
dealing’.230  Peden also takes the view that the use of ‘good faith’ in s 51 AC 
could simply mean ‘honesty’ or a ‘lack of ill will’ as is the case in many other 
pieces of legislation.231   
 
For the purposes of this paper, it is in the area of contractual performance and 
enforcement that the interplay between s 51AC and a common law claim 
based on breach of a good faith obligation needs to be considered.  A recent 
decision that involved arguments based on breach of an express good faith 
obligation and breach of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is 
Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd.232  As a rare example of 
where relief was considered available under both heads of claim, the decision 
is significant and warrants further examination. 
 
Automasters Australia Pty Ltd (‘Automasters’), as franchisor, alleged that 
Bruness Pty Ltd (‘Bruness’), as franchisee, was in breach of a franchise 
agreement relating to the operation of an automotive service business.  The 
alleged breaches were principally referable to an obligation to maintain the 
data entry system, which in turn enabled the franchisor to ensure the proper 
                                                 
225 Although there are twelve criteria listed, the Full Federal Court has made it clear that it 
distorts the proper operation of the section to search through the twelve criteria, find a 
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amount of royalties was being paid under the franchise agreement.  Bruness 
maintained that problems with the data entry system were due to the quality of 
the computer system installed on behalf of Automasters and, in particular, the 
inability of the computer software to operate efficiently.233 
 
Automasters purported to terminate the franchise agreement and sought 
damages and other curial relief.  By way of counterclaim, Bruness sought, 
amongst other things, a declaration that the franchise had not been 
terminated, damages for breach of contract and damages under the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  Bruness claimed that the conduct of Automasters 
was unconscionable under s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and 
also contravened clause 15.1 of the franchise agreement.  Clause 15.1 
obliged Automasters, as franchisor, to use its best endeavours to promote the 
performance and success of the franchise business and to deal with the 
franchisee in absolute good faith.  It was not in dispute that effect could be 
given to an express contractual term concerning good faith, even though the 
content of the express term may be a matter for individual determination.234 
 
In particular, Bruness alleged that Automasters’ actions were a manifestation 
of its determination to bring the franchise agreement to an end for reasons 
other than breaches of the contractual relationship.  It was alleged that 
Automasters was not motivated by a desire to protect its legitimate interests 
but by malice and/or revenge235 due to deterioration in the parties’ 
relationship.  In making this allegation, matters that were relied upon included:  
 
 Automasters’ resentment of Bruness’ frequent criticism of the computer 
hardware and software supplied by Automasters; 
 
 the insistence of Bruness that a former employee should be dismissed 
by Automasters and charged with a criminal offence; 
 
 complaints by Bruness to the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission that Automasters had acted unconscionably; 
 
 a refusal by Automasters to supply Bruness with a copy of a report 
relating to quality assurance certification, being a report relied upon by 
Automasters to issue a default notice; 
 
 Automasters’ purported termination of the franchise agreement 
notwithstanding that the quality assurance auditor’s report did not 
terminate the accreditation of Bruness; and  
 
 the refusal of Automasters to entertain a request for mediation 
pursuant to Part IV of the Franchising Code of Conduct.236 
 
                                                 
233 Ibid [110]. 
234 Ibid [140]. 
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Bruness further contended that Automasters used the threat of termination in 
an attempt to force Bruness to dispose of the franchise to Automasters for a 
price well below its true market value.237 
 
Due to the presence of the express provision concerning good faith in the 
franchise agreement, it was unnecessary for Hasluck J to determine whether 
an obligation of good faith should be implied.  Nevertheless, the findings of 
the court are helpful in delineating the nature of the good faith obligation and 
the operation of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  In determining 
whether a party had acted in good faith, Hasluck J observed that this might 
require the court to give some consideration to the motives of that party.238 
 
Having examined all the circumstances, Hasluck J concluded that the relevant 
officers of Automasters were looking for ways and means of bringing the 
franchise to an end (as was the case in Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd).239  Their actions in 
issuing a notice of default, in circumstances where this was not contemplated 
by the quality assurance report, and where there was considerable doubt 
concerning the reliability of various data entry non-compliance lists, were 
unreasonable and capricious.240  Their failure to have regard to the legitimate 
interests of the franchisee amounted to oppressive conduct241 entitling 
Bruness to relief for breach of the express good faith term. 
 
For substantially the same reasons that supported a finding of a lack of good 
faith, Hasluck J characterised Automasters’ conduct as unconscionable within 
the meaning of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  The 
misconduct complained of was ‘serious, unfair and oppressive and showed no 
regard for conscience.’242  Hasluck J was not prepared to regard this as a 
case where the franchisor had simply acted in accordance with its contractual 
rights.243  Hasluck J made the following important observation concerning the 
interaction between contractual good faith and s 51AC unconscionability: 
 
 The notion of unconscionable conduct may not be co-extensive with conduct 
conforming to the requirement to act in good faith but conduct which is held to be 
unconscionable within the meaning of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act will probably 
be sufficient to constitute a breach of an express term providing for absolute good 
faith between the parties.244 
 
It is submitted, with respect, that this observation is undoubtedly correct but 
that any analysis that seeks to equate a lack of good faith with 
                                                 
237 Ibid [385]. 
238 Ibid [148].  Hasluck J cited, with approval, an observation to this effect by W D Duncan in 
‘The Implication of a Term of Good Faith in Commercial Leases’ (2002) 9 APLJ 209: ibid 
[146]. 
239 (2000) 178 ALR 304. 
240 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [391]. 
241 Ibid [393]. 
242 Ibid [399]. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid [388]. 
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unconscionability, rather than vice versa, must be approached with great 
caution.  Although, in the particular factual circumstances encountered by 
Hasluck J, the franchisee successfully placed reliance on both claims; this is 
one of few decisions to this effect.  Further, it must be recognised that the 
franchisor’s breach of the requirements of the Franchising Code of Conduct245 
was a factor specifically taken into account (in accordance with s 51AC(3)(g) 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) in reaching a conclusion that the 
conduct complained of was unconscionable.  For this reason, it is submitted 
that the decision is best characterised as an example of particular 
unconscionable conduct that also demonstrated a lack of good faith, rather 
than supporting any hypothesis strictly equating a lack of common law good 
faith with statutory unconscionability. 
 




The issue of contractual motive will often be a fundamental one in good faith 
disputes and it is an issue on which opinions inevitably vary.246  The traditional 
19th century common law approach (to an exploration of motive) is well 
illustrated by Will J who opined that a right given by a contract to one party 
may be exercised against the other ‘no matter how wicked, cruel, or mean the 
motive may be which determines the enforcement of the right.’247  Prior to the 
advent of current Australian good faith jurisprudence, similar views had been 
expressed by members of the Australian judiciary.  In Champtaloup v 
Thomas248 Glass JA warned that the danger of a requirement that the 
exercise of a contractual power had to be actuated by a legitimate purpose 
was that it would involve a ‘judicial trek through a quagmire of mixed 
motives.’249  Similarly, Beaumont J in Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth250 held that if powers are exercised in accordance with the 
terms of the contract, there is no requirement that their exercise be actuated 
by a ‘legitimate purpose’, and the motive of one party in exercising the 
contractual power is irrelevant.251  Given these traditional approaches, the 
observation that common law lawyers are reluctant ‘to commit themselves to 
forensic inquiries into motivation’252 seems apposite. 
 
                                                 
245 A code to regulate the conduct of participants in franchising. 
246 See, eg, I B Stewart, ‘Good Faith in Contractual Performance and in Negotiation’ (1998) 
72 ALJ 370. 
247 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1, 46.  This traditional view continues to be followed in English 
common law.  As recently noted by Finkelstein J (in turn citing Professor Goode), ‘the English 
take the view that legal rights can be exercised regardless of motive.’: Pacific Brands Sport & 
Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 288, [61]. 
248 [1976] 2 NSWLR 264. 
249 Champtaloup v Thomas [1976] 2 NSWLR 264, 271. 
250 (1988) 80 ALR 35. 
251 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 80 ALR 35, 38.  It is acknowledged that 
the material in this paragraph is derived from the article of Stewart, above n 246, 371. 
252 H K Lucke, ‘Good Faith and Contractual Performance’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on 
Contract (1987) 155, 182. 
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However, the advent of the good faith obligation has brought with it a judicial 
recognition in Australia that a court may now be required to examine the 
motivation underlying the exercise of contractual rights.253  In turn, this will 
have implications for commercial parties and their advisers concerning the 
ambit of acceptable commercial contractual behaviour. 
 
3.2 What is Permissible and What is Not? 
 
Consistent with earlier comments, a party to a commercial contract is not 
required to act in a contractually altruistic manner or in a manner akin to a 
fiduciary.  Express provision aside, a commercial client is not required to 
subordinate their own immediate or longer-term business or other interests to 
those of the other party.254  An obligation of good faith still allows the parties 
to retain their economic autonomy or economic liberty.255  Although not strictly 
required to demonstrate that any decision accords with a ‘business judgment’ 
approach or ‘future business needs’,256 if the exercise of a contractual 
discretion or power has both an honest basis and an explanation that is in 
accordance with the reasonable expectations of both contractual parties257 it 
is unlikely to be contrary to the implied obligation of good faith.258 
 
The most common allegation of conduct contrary to a good faith requirement 
will require the court to examine the motive for the exercise of a contractual 
right to determine if the right is being exercised ‘capriciously or for some 
extraneous purpose.’259  Consistent with previous observations, it is 
suggested that a contractual right will be exercised capriciously where there is 
no rational basis for the exercise of the right or no explanation for the exercise 
of the right260 that is in accordance with the parties’ reasonable expectations.  
The selfish exercise of a contractual right calculated to destroy the contractual 
position of the other party to the contract may well be contrary to the implied 
obligation of good faith.261  Nevertheless, to succeed in a claim of this type, 
the plaintiff will need to produce compelling evidence of motive. 
 
As was the case in Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd262 an 
argument based on inference, rather than evidence of substance, is unlikely 
to succeed.  Where compelling proof is available that the sole or dominant 
                                                 
253 See, eg, Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286, [353]. 
254 Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [65]; Esso Australia Resources Pty 
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[2007] NSWSC 104, [112]. 
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258 Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [83]. 
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demonstrated motive of a party to a commercial contract was for a purpose 
totally inimical to the reasonable expectations of the contractual parties, the 
prospects of successful reliance on the implied term will increase dramatically.  
For example, a franchisor’s conduct that is deliberately calculated to damage 
the franchisee’s business will be regarded as inconsistent with a proper 
relationship between franchisor and franchisee and will be demonstrative of a 
lack of good faith.263 
 
3.3 Contractual Exclusion - Avoiding the Argument?  
 
Given the many unresolved issues concerning the operation of the implied 
obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement, by 
necessity, commercial advisers will consider the possibility of either express 
or implied contractual exclusion, where a good faith obligation may otherwise 
be implied.  This is an issue that I have considered at length elsewhere.264  
For present purposes, it will suffice to simply restate some of the conclusions 
reached as part of that earlier analysis. 
 
If an ‘opting out’ clause is ‘precise, specific, not antithetical to the entire 
purpose or intent of the remainder of the contract, and is not unconscionable 
or contrary to public policy it ought to be enforceable.’265  To be an effective 
‘opting out’ clause, it will be prudent to say expressly that the implied 
obligation of good faith does not apply to the extent that the implied obligation 
may limit the rights otherwise lawfully available under the terms of the contract 
or at law.  Another approach would be to state clearly that: 
 
the discretionary right in question [as the case may be] is not subject to the 
expectations, ‘reasonable or otherwise,’ of the parties to the contract and that any 
action taken pursuant to the provision is ‘deemed to be exercised in good faith.’266 
 
As Grover has commented: 
 
The courts are not ready to read down freedom of contract explicitly if you can avoid 
the illegality and public policy arguments and your client does not have the status of 
fiduciary.  A clear clause will embarrass the judiciary into submission … 267 
 
As indicated by this quotation, although express ‘opting out’ of the implied 
good faith obligation appears to be contractually possible, this is not to 
suggest that every ‘opting out’ clause will be upheld.  Consistent with public 
policy concerns about provisions condoning dishonesty, a clause which 
                                                 
263 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty 
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disclaims absolutely any obligation of good faith or allows one party to the 
contract to be dishonest or wantonly destructive of the fruits of the contract is 
unlikely to be validated.268  Depending on the circumstances, an ‘opting out’ 
clause of this nature may also be indicative of unconscionability269 or may 
possibly operate to render the contract illusory.270 
 
Of course, if a commercial document clearly and unambiguously disavows 
any implied obligation of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement, it will then be a matter for a party’s commercial judgment if the 
party is prepared to sign the document in that form.  In this way, the 
commercial reality is that the debate may be transformed from a potential 
post-contractual good faith debate to a debate centred on contract formation 
issues.  These issues are beyond the scope of this paper.  Suffice to say, a 
party who signs such a document in circumstances where the party was 
offered no realistic choice or denied the opportunity to negotiate, may not be 
left without a remedy, albeit not necessarily a common law remedy. 
 
Finally, consistent with observations that I have made elsewhere,271 if it is 
intended to exclude the implied good faith obligation, it should not be 
assumed that a ‘sole discretion’ clause or an ‘entire agreement’ clause will, in 
isolation, be sufficient. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This brief examination of Australian good faith litigation demonstrates both 
judicial inconsistency and caution at lower court levels.  Examples of 
successful reliance on the implied obligation of good faith in contractual 
performance and enforcement remain relatively few.272  Perhaps this is not 
surprising, being arguably a reflection of the content of the good faith 
obligation being consonant with, and shaped by, the reasonable expectations 
of both contractual parties.  An underlying basis of reasonable expectations 
does not preclude the pursuit of legitimate self-interest.  Decisions that some 
may consider harsh in their result,273 merely serve as a striking illustration of 
this point.  To successfully pursue a claim for breach of the implied obligation 
of good faith compelling proof will be required that a contractual party has 
acted in a manner clearly beyond the reasonable expectations engendered by 
the relevant commercial context.  This will usually require direct proof of 
substance rather than arguments based on inference or the like.274 
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As I have noted before,275 if the High Court were to accept that the basis of 
the implied good faith obligation is the reasonable (or legitimate) expectations 
of the contracting parties, then the introduction of good faith into contract law 
should not be seen as ‘judicial moralism’276 but merely the adoption of a 
doctrinal approach that has been well recognised in recent times.277  
Commercial contract law would still be fundamentally about achieving one’s 
own ends, but those ends would be ‘understood largely in terms of the context 
out of which they arise’278 and the reasonable expectations engendered by 
that commercial context. 
 
However, until such time as the High Court meets this challenge, commercial 
advisers will continue to best serve their client’s interests by clear and explicit 
contractual drafting. 
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